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Two Key Questions
• What do we expect the human to do?
• What is the human doing now?
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3Flightcrew “mind the gap” between 10-9 hazard and 10-5 automation
Sherry, L., Mauro, R. (2014) Design of Cockpit Displays to Explicitly Support Flightcrew Intervention Tasks.
In Proceedings IEEE/AIAA 33rd Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC), Colorado Springs, Co. Oct, 2014. 
A thought experiment
• Human error has been implicated in 70% to 
80% of accidents in civil and military aviation 
(Weigmann & Shappell, 2001).
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A thought experiment
• Human error has been implicated in 70% to 80% of 
accidents in civil and military aviation (Weigmann & 
Shappell, 2001).
• Pilots intervene to manage aircraft malfunctions on 
20% of normal flights (PARC/CAST, 2013).
• World-wide jet data from 2007-2016 (Boeing, 2016)
– 244 million departures
– 388 accidents
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A Little Problem with our Assumptions
• Human error has been implicated in 70% to 
80% of accidents in civil and military aviation 
(Weigmann & Shappell, 2001).
Wrong! 100% of accidents are due to human 
limitations!
12
A Little Problem with our Assumptions
• Human error has been implicated in 70% to 
80% of accidents in civil and military aviation 
(Weigmann & Shappell, 2001).
Wrong! 100% of accidents are due to human 
limitations!
• Pilots intervene to manage aircraft 
malfunctions on 20% of normal flights 
(PARC/CAST, 2013).
Pilots intervene in various ways on 100% of 
flights!
13
A Little Problem with our Assumptions
• Human error has been implicated in 70% to 80% of 
accidents in civil and military aviation (Weigmann & 
Shappell, 2001).
Wrong! 100% of accidents are due to human 
limitations!
• Pilots intervene to manage aircraft malfunctions on 
20% of normal flights (PARC/CAST, 2013).
Pilots intervene in various ways on 100% of flights!
• World-wide jet data from 2007-2016 (Boeing, 2016)
– 244 million departures
– 388 accidents
How do you define “accident”?
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Human-Centered?
• It’s the humans who make the system work 
and for humans’ sake.
• The system is centered on the human.
• So we better design the system to be human-
centered to best support the humans in their 
work.




• By understanding the complexity of the 
operation.
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• By creating a clear, coherent, consistent, and 
comprehensive guidance throughout.
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• THE Model, the 4C’s and the 4P’s.
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Thank you!
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